

22 October 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : Andrew T. Falkiewicz
Assistant to the Director
SUBJECT : Contacts with the Press

Listed below is a summary of inquiries from the press reported by Agency personnel for 21 October.

<u>Media Representative</u>	<u>Agency Contact</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Henry Dormann publisher of new magazine, <i>Chief Executive</i>	Mr. Falkiewicz	Visited here. Would like article by DCI. We agreed to consider this after magazine is published (Spring 1977).
Eugene Patterson <i>St. Petersburg Times</i>	Mr. Falkiewicz	Said that he is drafting a resolution for the ASNE meeting at Honolulu on 16 Nov. The resolution will deal with CIA relations with journalists. He wanted to know if all relations have been terminated, as specified in 11 Feb. statement. We said we are still in the "as soon as feasible" time framework which we indicated would reasonably extend at least to the end of the year. His second query was to verify that foreign journalists not working for any American organization were <u>not</u> included in the 11 Feb. statement; we confirmed. He said that

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Eugene Patterson
St. Petersburg Times

the thrust of a possible resolution would be to urge the US to show good example of respect for free press by voluntarily giving up intelligence use of any journalist anywhere in the world.

David Binder
John Crewdson
New York Times

Mr. Falkiewicz

Asked about United Fruit story. We said it old hat.

Tony Marro
Newsweek

Mr. Falkiewicz

Asked if Orlando Bosch had any contact with Chileans. We cannot help.

STATINTL



Andrew T. Falkiewicz

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FOLDER

6/24/98

Viewpoints

Playing Politics With the Mayaguez

By Gregory G. Rushford

The White House response to the recent report on the Mayaguez affair demonstrates an old political truism: To avoid answering criticism throw up a smoke-screen by attacking your critic's motives. The press will be distracted by the sensational aspects of partisan strife; scarcely anyone will address the issue on its merits; soon the episode will recede from memory. It's surprising how well this tactic works in supposedly sophisticated times.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger sniffed that the report, prepared for a congressional subcommittee by the General Accounting Office, was based on "inadequate materials," and told reporters "I was there, and I know what information the government was working from."

During the second TV debate with Jimmy Carter, President Ford avoided admitting that the White House had tried to block the report's release. Instead he complained of its authorship by a "grandstand quarterback" who had "interjected partisan politics" into an issue of national security by releasing the report just before the debate. Editorial writers generally sided with the President, and as the White House had anticipated, the report's merits were lost in the shuffle.

Here is the background for readers who want to judge for themselves who was playing partisan politics to the country's detriment.

In May, 1975, when the Cambodians seized the Mayaguez, the United States was smarting over South Vietnam's ignominious collapse. An outrageous act of piracy called for strong military moves and the administration took them, to its credit. The errors made should be judged in this context.

Shortly after the incident, Rep. Dante B. Fascell (D-Fla.) chaired a House International Relations subcommittee to investigate. His hearings were frustrated because the administration sent relatively low-level officials who were not fully informed on the decision-making process. Lacking adequate staff himself, Fascell then asked the GAO to probe more deeply into the crisis. It was a reasonable request, and post-mortems often provide insights on how to improve performance in the future. And the operation's efficiency was certainly open to question (to save the 40 lives of the Mayaguez crew 41 rescuers lost their lives).

The trouble was, Kissinger would not cooperate. In July, 1975, the GAO asked the National Security Council for documents necessary to the inquiry. More than five weeks elapsed before the NSC's secretary informed the GAO that "we have already provided a great deal of information" to Congress to which the GAO was welcome. Since the information submitted

to Congress had been so inadequate as to spark a fuller investigation, the secretary's response drew the battle lines. Throughout 1975 the investigators engaged in a persistent struggle for access to information. They were denied access to considerable data, thus allowing Kissinger to scorn their efforts as incomplete.

By early 1976 the GAO was ready to publish its findings. It had not been permitted to see evidence of serious deficiencies in U.S. intelligence agencies which the CIA and its military intelligence counterparts were well aware of. Even without that information, however, the record was indeed flawed.

Although U.S. intelligence learned the Cambodians had seized a Panamanian ship several days before the Mayaguez seizure, and had fired upon a South Korean ship before that, the information was not disseminated properly in the government. Nor was it passed on to our ships near Cambodian coastal waters. A bureaucratic "misunderstanding" delayed distribution of the initial intelligence warning; it was received by State Department intelligence but not immediately shared with the department's operational side. In the low-key words of the report, some "important details on the possible location of the crew did not reach decisionmakers," which helps explain why Washington did not know where the crew was—the central question.

On the other hand, the GAO also handed its share of praise: Our initial military efforts did help to get the crew back, even though the Marines landed after the crew had been released; "command and control" of military communications was effective. The report also commented on the "valor and prowess" of American servicemen.

The most stinging criticism of an otherwise mild report was its questioning of the effectiveness of diplomatic initiatives to release the crew. The investigators found that the Cambodians might have been prepared to accept a political solution because of the initial U.S. show of force. Not taken into account, the GAO said, was "a report received more than 14 hours

CONTINUED

before the Marine assault was initiated and which indicated that a foreign government was using its influence with Cambodia to seek an early release of the Mayaguez and expected it to be released soon." Furthermore, the administration did not attempt "several possibilities for communication with the new Cambodian government."

These findings were to be released last May (before the Republican convention in August, when nobody contemplated a presidential debate). In March the Defense Department expressed no opposition on national security grounds to publication of the report. But the report remained "secret" at the insistence of the White House staff.

Lawrence S. Eagleburger, an able, tough Kissinger aide who has been described as "Henry's Haldeman and Colson rolled into one," wrote the GAO in March, calling the congressional investigators "amateurs." The GAO staff, he said, had gone "out of their way to develop wholly fictional diplomatic scenarios which bore no resemblance to the fact or reality, and then criticized the administration for its 'failure' to pursue their fantasies." This established the groundwork for the effort to discredit the investigators instead of answering the criticism on the merits.

During his second TV debate President Ford asserted that the White House had given permission to release the report on July 12. Actually, the White House merely submitted on that day a paragraph-by-paragraph analysis of which parts of the report it sanctioned for publication and which it didn't. Negotiations between the White House and the committee continued until mid-September. When the committee finally accepted White House conditions, it took a few more weeks for editing and printing before publication, which happened to coincide with the second debate. It can be argued that, had the report been released in July, the committee would have been accused of interfering with Ford's nomination struggle with Ronald Reagan.

Where had I heard all this before?

While the GAO investigated Mayaguez, the House Intelligence Committee, which I served as a staff aide, was discovering similar—but by far more serious—breakdowns of U.S. intelligence at critical junctures. The CIA and its counterparts bungled warnings of the 1973 Middle East War, the 1974 Cyprus and Portuguese coups, the 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam and other cases.

Kissinger denied us access to information. Eagleburger was sent to denounce the effort. The administration pressured Congress to kill the report, and denied the parts which were leaked to the press. Lost in the squabble were the investigative findings, and the press focused on political strife. There has been no substantial reform in the U.S. intelligence agencies. The episode recedes from memory.

Isn't it interesting how the same thing happened to Fascell?

Gregory G. Rushford was an investigator for the House Select Committee on Intelligence during its recent investigation of the CIA.

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
TO:	DCI A/DCI	
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS: Executive Registry		26 OCT 1964 AT INTL
76-5501		
<p>① PTF what are your instructions to DR Donnagan? Please discuss</p> <p>② [REDACTED]</p> <p>CO/AT INTL</p>		
FROM: A/DCI DCI		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE

Park Office

Executive Registry		
76-10384		
TRANSMITTERAL SLIP	DATE 16/28	
TO: Andrew Salkiewicz		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS: F.Y.T		
STATINTL		
FROM: [REDACTED] <i>H/CT</i>		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION
FORM NO. 241 1 FEB 55 REPLACES FORM 36-B WHICH MAY BE USED.		

DCI PUBLIC APPEARANCE

Event: David R. Deaner Memorial Lecture Series

Place: Dixon Hall, Tulane

Date: November 15, 1976

Time: 7:30-9:00 p.m.

Speaking from Text

Yes _____

No _____
x

**Need Press Office Help
to Prepare Text**

Yes _____

No _____
x

Hand Out Text _____

Limited Release _____

Embargoed Release _____

Want Press Office to Attend

Yes _____

No _____
x

Press Conference

Yes _____

No _____
x

**Need Press Office Help
to Set Up Press Conference**

Yes _____

No _____
x

Special Press Assistance Required

Comments

30 minute speech followed by 30 Q&A from panel of 3 teachers (One is a General International Relations specialist; another will be a S.E. Asia specialist and the third will be the moderator) This session will be followed by 15-20 minute student Q&A session

Travel Arrangements

Neil will introduce you.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY PAGE

Bob [Signature]

Contact Neil Bush -- [REDACTED]

STATOT

call him on Mon, Wed, or Fri at 11:30 a.m.

STATOT

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
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OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	DCI		
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ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY	
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Remarks:


I have seen attached note.
If I can be of help, please let me
know.

Andrew T. Falkiewicz
26 October 1976

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
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10-26

Mr. George Bush



STATINTL

I'm [REDACTED]
Son-in-Law — married to
[REDACTED]

We're being reassigned
to Moscow by UPI & I
was in your building
taking some briefings.

Had hoped to have a
cup of coffee with you.
Here until Thursday
at Hotel Washington rm. 1011.

Regards

STATOTHR

Pete Allegro

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Executive Registry

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

26 - 10383

FROM THE DESK OF
THE DIRECTOR

~~Jennifer-pls.read then pass to ATF~~

STATINTL

ATF :

[REDACTED] has volunteered to speak for
the CIA when we are invited to speak
and can't fill the bill.

Let's discuss this. There are tons of
invites that we can't handle and it might
make good sense to have a list of people, knowledgeable
on CIA, who can go forth to speak....

Please discuss... no rush

GB 10-23

EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE

Bob Agnew

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Release 2001/11/20 : CIA-RDP79M00467A002700100001

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
		20 Oct 76
TO: Mr. Andrew Falkiewicz		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
FROM:		
DCI		
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

FROM THE DESK OF
THE DIRECTOR

Executive Registry
76-3747

ATF:

We ought to see that this gets some distribution on
the Hill to our committees.....
elsewhere too if possible.
I'll be interested to see if Post or Times
use this.... please advise.

GB 10-20

EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE *Ruth Blass*

HFR 10-20

(DCP)

A I
PM-COMMENT ADV20 10-19
ADV FOR PMS WED OCT 20
(650)

FOREIGN NEWS COMMENTARY:
SOVIET PRESS HAS A FIELD DAY WITH THE CIA
BY HOWARD R. TYNER

JUST AS RECENTLY THE
CIA IS UP IN US after all
the publicity—the same
reaction may occur among
some Soviet citizens.

MOSCOW (UPI) -- THE CHIEF SPORT IN THE SOVIET PRESS THESE DAYS IS
NOT SOCCER OR ICE HOCKEY, BUT HANGING OUT THE DIRTY LINEN OF THE U.S.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

HARDLY A DAY GOES BY WITHOUT SOME NEWSPAPER OR MAGAZINE, AND OFTEN
RADIO AND TELEVISION, TOO, CARRYING NEW ALLEGATIONS ABOUT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE SO-CALLED "MONSTER OF LANGLEY."

"CIA-CONNECTIONS WITH MAFIA," TASS NEWS AGENCY SAID IN A TYPICAL
HEADLINE. "CIA SHADOW OVER INDIA," THE WEEKLY NOVOE VREMYE SAID IN
ANOTHER. IF IT ISN'T EXPERIMENTATION WITH LSD, THEN IT'S THE
UNSERVING OF SOME AFRICAN COUNTRY, OR HELPING ISRAEL WITH ITS
"CRIMINAL" RAID LAST JULY TO FREE HIJACK HOSTAGES AT ENTERBEB AIRPORT
IN UGANDA.

NEVER IS THERE MENTION OF THE CIA'S ARCH-RIVAL, THE SOVIET KGB.
MOST STORIES ARE LITTLE MORE THAN EMBELLISHED VERSIONS OF FACT--OR
RUMOR--PUBLISHED ELSEWHERE. A POPULAR TECHNIQUE IS TO ATTRIBUTE
ACCUSATIONS CONCERNING THE AGENCY TO "PRESS REPORTS," BUT NOT SAY
WHERE THOSE REPORTS APPEARED.

THUS TASS, QUOTING THESE ANONYMOUS "PRESS REPORTS," SUGGESTED THAT
CIA AND PENTAGON EXPERIMENTS ON BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS MAY HAVE
BACKFIRED, CAUSING THE "LEGIONNAIRES DISEASE" THAT KILLED NEARLY 30
U.S. VETERANS WHO ATTENDED A CONFERENCE IN PHILADELPHIA IN JULY.

OTHER MATERIAL IS ORIGINAL--SUCH AS THE CLAIM BY THE WEEKLY
LITERATURNAYA GAZETA THAT THREE MOSCOW-BASED AMERICAN CORRESPONDENTS
WORKED FOR THE CIA.

WESTERN DIPLOMATICS SAY THEY CAN'T RECALL WHEN THE INTENSITY OF
ANTI-CIA PROPAGANDA HERE REACHED SUCH A PEAK AS IN THE PAST SIX
MONTHS.

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THE SOVIET UNION IS SPREADING SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT. DIPLOMATS SAY THE CURRENT BARRAGE IS MOST LIKELY AN ATTEMPT TO TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF WIDESPREAD DOMESTIC AMERICAN CRITICISM OF THE CIA FOLLOWING DISCLOSURES ABOUT SOME OF ITS CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES.

BUT THE GENERAL CHILLING OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE PAST YEAR ALSO PROBABLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE KREMLIN DECISION TO LAUNCH THE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN, ACCORDING TO THE DIPLOMATS.

AN EXAMPLE OF THE TYPE OF STORY THAT HAS BEEN APPEARING WAS A RECENT TWO-PART REPORT ON MOSCOW TELEVISION CALLED "THE CIA'S SECRET WAR."

PRESENTED AS A DOCUMENTARY, THE PROGRAM INCLUDED LONG-RANGE MOTION PICTURES OF CIA HEADQUARTERS AT LANGLEY, VA; AND OLD NEWSREEL FOOTAGE LINKED TO THE HISTORY OF THE ORGANIZATION.

THE COMMENTATOR NOTED, "IT IS NO LONGER A SECRET TO ANYONE THAT THE CIA IS ENGAGED IN WIDESPREAD ESPIONAGE AND MAKES WIDE USE OF AMERICAN JOURNALISTS, BUSINESSMEN AND EVEN TOURISTS."

THE CONCLUSION WAS THAT THE CIA IS "A WILD ANIMAL DANGEROUS BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES."

THE GOVERNMENT NEWSPAPER IZVESTIA POOH-POOCHED THE ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION SET UP BY PRESIDENT FORD TO INVESTIGATE CIA ACTIVITIES. THE COMMISSION, ACCORDING TO IZVESTIA, "DID NOT DARE" TO SAY ANYTHING TOO BAD ABOUT THE CIA BECAUSE THE INVESTIGATORS THEMSELVES--LIKE THE CIA--WERE TOO CLOSE TO AMERICA'S "MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX."

A FAVORITE TARGET OF SOVIET PRESS RIDICULE ARE THE AMERICAN FINANCED, MUNICH-BASED RADIO FREE EUROPE AND RADIO LIBERTY, WHICH BROADCAST TO THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE.

ONCE FUNDED BY THE CIA, THE STATIONS NOW RECEIVE THEIR FINANCING DIRECTLY FROM THE U.S. CONGRESS. YET DOZENS OF CURRENT ARTICLES HERE LINK THE STATIONS WITH THE CIA, EVEN TO THE EXTENT OF ACCUSING LORD CHALFONTE--BRITAIN'S FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER AND UNITED NATIONS AMBASSADOR--OF BEING AN "INTERCESSOR" FOR THE AGENCY BECAUSE HE PRaised THE WORK OF RADIO LIBERTY AND RADIO FREE EUROPE.

BUT THE CIA MAY NOT BE THE SOVIET MEDIA'S NO. 1 ANTIHERO FOR LONG. RECENT ARTICLES HAVE INCLUDED SUCH ITEMS AS "CROOKED MEN FROM THE FBI" AND "NEW DISCLOSURES OF FBI ACTIVITIES," MEANING THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION MAY BE IN FOR THE SAME SORT OF TREATMENT.

ADV FOR RMS 460 OCT 20

UPI 10-19 06117 RED

Executive Registry
76-5427/A

October 19, 1976

Dear Jack,

The answer, of course, is yes.

I don't know what the heck I could say about "The American Presidency in Transition" which would be of any interest whatsoever to your class at American University. But on the proviso that they promise not to throw anything at me, I will be glad to be there. Let's get in touch right after the first of the year.

Warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

George Bush

Mr. Jack Valenti
President
Motion Picture Association
of America, Inc.
1600 Eye Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

DCI/GB/mj1
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee

1 - [REDACTED]
① - ER

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip

EA/DCI

TO:

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9	GC				
10	LC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/Pers				
14	D/S				
15	DTR				
16	Asst/DCI			✓	
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPS				
19	DCI/SS				
20	EA/DCI	✓			
21					
22					
	SUSPENSE			Date	

Remarks:

Executive Secretary

76-5727



MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION
OF AMERICA, INC.
1600 EYE STREET, NORTHWEST
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

JACK VALENTI
PRESIDENT

October 8, 1976

dictated

My dear George

I come to you with a request which, Lord knows, collides with your very busy schedule. But I am speculating that you would respond to this as I would if you were to direct it to me.

I am embarking on a new enterprise beginning in January. I will be teaching a course -- THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY IN TRANSITION -- for master's degree graduate students in political science at American University in Washington.

I would be so very grateful if you would give me one evening of your life to come before this class and discuss with them your own brand of expertise on this subject. I don't have to tell you that these students would count your appearance a highlight.

The class begins at 8:10 pm and ends at 10:40 pm, each Monday. The first class is scheduled for January 17, 1977, and the last class is April 25. If you would come one evening, we would work out a date suitable to your schedule.

Would you be agreeable to being with me and these students one evening?


I would consider your appearance a "marker" on me. You can collect on it any time you want.

May I hear from you, and I hope, favorably?

Sincerely,

The Honorable George Bush
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Jan



MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC.
1600 EYE STREET, NORTHWEST
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006

The Honorable George Bush
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

P. O'Brien 11/20/88
Executive Registry

26-5005/i

October 19, 1976

Dear Mr. Kagan,

A while back you wrote me about the possibility of my being a Chubb Fellow at Yale. I told you that I was not able to do it this fall, but if rain checks were in order I would be glad to consider it for a later date.

I have a suggestion that might conceivably be of interest to you. Recently Admiral Noel Gayler retired as Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. He is a very articulate Naval officer who has had enormously important jobs. CINCPAC, of course, is one of the very top four star Navy jobs. Prior to that Admiral Gayler was in charge of the National Security Agency, a very important component of our Intelligence Community.

Admiral Gayler retired last month, and should you be looking for someone with his wide variety of talents I think he would be interested in coming to Yale. He is attractive and communicates well with children. He is not a hard-line, doctrinaire kind of guy although he certainly is a proponent of strong defense.

Having been a Chubb Fellow and appreciating what it is all about, I can recommend Admiral Gayler to you for your consideration should you STATOTHR still have some openings and should a Naval officer fill the bill.

OTHR

His address is: Admiral Noel Gayler, [REDACTED]

Please don't bother to acknowledge this. Simply contact Admiral Gayler if he is of interest to you.

Yours very truly,

/s/ George Bush

George Bush

Mr. Donald Kagan
Master
Chubb Fellowship
Timothy Dwight College
Yale University
New Haven, Connecticut 06520

DCI/GB/mjl

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1 DCI 1 - ER

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MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI *SD myl 10/10/76* STATINTL

The panelists were Mike Malanick, Ted Shackley,
"Zeke" Zellmer, and [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] in Andrew

Falkiewicz' office. A buckslip is attached expressing
your thanks for a job well done.

STATINTL [REDACTED]

D/ES
13 Oct 76

Date

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5-75 EDITIONS

DCI/DCI

Routing Slip

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3	S/MC			13	Compt		
4	DDS&T		X	14	Asst/DCI		X
5	DDI		X	15	AO/DCI		
6	DD C		X	16	Ex/Sec		
7	DDO		X	17	D/OCI		X
8	D/DCI/IC			18			
9	D/DCI/NIO			19			
10	GC			20			

SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks:

My thanks to all for a job well done!

DCI/DRGI
14 OCT 1976*Pab. off*

Executive Registry
76-257375



AIR FORCE ASSOCIATION
1750 PENNSYLVANIA AVE., N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 452-7300
An Independent Non Profit Aerospace Organization

GEORGE M. DOUGLAS

President

October 8, 1976

Dear Mr. Bush:

On behalf of the officers and members of the Air Force Association, I extend our deep thanks to you and to the Agency for arranging the briefing for our national convention delegates last month.

Seldom have we received such praise for a single program. This obviously reflects the high caliber of the briefers and is an acknowledgment of the forthright and candid presentation which our delegates received.

I want to especially thank Mr. E. Henry Knoche for his introductory remarks, Mr. Paul Walsh, who did a wonderful job as Panel Moderator, the four panelists, and [REDACTED] who was most efficient in working out administrative details with our staff.

Thank you again for allowing us to share in this most informative and worthwhile program.


Sincerely,

The Honorable George Bush
Director of Central Intelligence
CIA
Washington, DC 20505

kcc

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Public Affairs

DDCI Public Appearance

23 Aug 76

Event: Air Force Association 30th Annual National Convention

Place: Washington, D.C. CIA Headquarters

Date: 22 September 1976

Time:

Speaking from Text

Yes No Need Press Office Help
to Prepare TextYes No

Hand Out Text _____

Limited Release _____

Embargoed Release _____

Want Press Office to Attend

Yes No

Press Conference

Yes No Either wayNeed Press Office Help
to Set Up Press ConferenceYes No

Special Press Assistance Required

Comments

Let's get a good text
describing the new look in intelligence
and the role we play in
advancing for. pt. formulation

Travel Arrangements

Pub Affairs

Security to Accompany

Yes No STATINTL